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Comparing Sweden to other EU countries, labour force participation rates of older 
individuals and females are high. These facts are consistent with the idea that insti-
tutional design matters: access to child care, paid parental leave, and a tax system with 
individual rather than household income taxation, probably explain a significant fraction 
of the high female participation rate; and the evidence suggests that the design of 
pension systems has an impact on the labour force participation of the elderly. Active 
labour market policies may contribute to high labour force participation, but cannot be 
relied on as a major means of raising employment and participation in the long run. 
Keywords: Labour supply, taxes, income support systems 
JEL-codes: H55, J21, J26, 
                                                 
1 IFAU – Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, e-mail: anders.forslund@ifau.uu.se. The author thanks Peter 
Fredriksson and seminar participants at an IFAU seminar for many constructive comments. They are not at all 
responsible for my use of their advice. 
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1  Introduction 
Sweden, as most European countries, has a set of extensive income support systems in 
place, providing i.a. unemployed persons, parents with young kids, students, sick per-
sons and old persons with the means to live at a decent standard of living despite a 
reduced capacity to earn a living through market work. In addition, education (including 
higher education), health care, care for the elderly and child care are mainly publicly 
provided and tax financed. 
Demographic projections for many EU countries indicate that their populations are 
ageing at fairly rapid rates. This development will exert pressure on the working-age 
population as well as on the public sector – in both cases because of the need to transfer 
resources from the shrinking working-age population to meet the needs of the growing 
share of older-age persons. In this perspective, labour supply issues and the creation of 
incentives for work play a central role. Maintaining a generous welfare state without 
creating disincentives for work (which will finally undermine the foundation for the 
welfare state) will become even more of a challenge than it already is. 
Against this background it is important to identify policies that seem to have 
promoted labour supply as well as policies that seem to have had the opposite effect. In 
this paper I use a benchmarking approach to identify dimensions in which Sweden 
stands out, both in terms of labour supply and in terms of policies likely to affect labour 
supply.  
2  Background – Swedish labour supply in a comparative 
perspective 
Naturally, the design of the core elements of the Swedish welfare state, such as social 
insurance, publicly provided education, health care, care for the elderly and child care, 
will have consequences in a large number of areas, including total labour supply. So 
will, of course, also the taxes that generate the revenues used to pay for those 
institutions. Finally, active labour market policies (ALMPs) have for a long time been a 
distinctive feature of the Swedish labour market, and may also affect labour supply. 
In this section I give a brief description of some main traits of Swedish labour 
supply. A convenient way to characterise Swedish labour supply is by way of 
IFAU – Labour supply incentives, income support systems and taxes in Sweden  3 comparing it to labour supply in other EU countries to identify dimensions where 
Sweden stands out.
2 Performing this exercise, one easily identifies a number of facts. 
First, female labour supply is significantly higher than in most EU countries.
3 In 2008, 
the average EU female participation rate was 65.5 %, whereas the corresponding 
Swedish number was 76.9 %. Second, labour force participation among the older was 
much higher than in any other EU country in 2008 (the EU average was 30.2 % as 
compared to 60.1 % among Swedish 60-64 year-olds). This does not primarily reflect 
high female participation rates; Sweden had the highest participation rates both among 
old males and old females. It is also noteworthy that the participation rate in this age 
group increased by about 8 percentage points between 1997 and 2008. Third, whereas 
inactivity is about average (slightly below at ages 16–24) among young Swedes, youth 
unemployment is relatively high and the employment rate is around the EU average at 
ages below 25. As pointed out by the OECD
4, the median age for starting higher 
education in Sweden is high.
5 In addition, the average duration of tertiary education is 
long. Combined, these two facts indicate that there is a margin to increase high-skilled 
labour supply. Fourth, Sweden has received large flows of non-EU immigrants, and 
these fare significantly worse than native Swedes or other EU citizens in the Swedish 
labour markets in terms of unemployment, employment and inactivity. However, 
immigrants from outside the EU fare worse than natives in most EU countries. 
Nevertheless, it seems that immigrants actually do relatively worse in Sweden than in 
other EU countries, along some dimensions. Having said this one should note that it is 
not entirely clear what the benchmark should be. A more thorough analysis would have 
to take both the share of political refugees among immigrants and the immigrants’ 
labour market relevant characteristics into account. 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, statistical information has been collected from Eurostat’s labour force survey data. 
3 In fact, only Denmark among the EU countries has a slightly higher female participation rate than Sweden. 
4 See for example the latest OECD Economic Survey of Sweden (OECD 2008). 
5 This does not primarily seem to reflect ”life-long learning”; a relatively large share of young persons enter tertiary 
education after a gap between secondary and tertiary education (Holmlund et al., 2008). 
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3  Institutions affecting labour supply 
In this section I will survey institutions that are likely to have an impact on labour 
supply. The description will give a brief account of the present systems and major steps 
in their development. In addition, evidence with bearing on labour supply-effects will 
be surveyed. A more detailed account of recent reforms and their effects (or expected 
effects) is, however, postponed to sections 4 and 5. 
A large number of institutions can be expected to have an impact on labour supply, 
employment and unemployment. Before describing some of these, there is a general 
point worth making in the Swedish case. This point is that most income support systems 
have benefits that in one way or the other are conditional on a previous work history. 
This is the case in unemployment insurance, where income related benefits are 
conditional on membership in an unemployment insurance fund and a sufficiently long 
work history. Sickness benefits depend on previous income, and the same is true for 
benefits during parental leave. Hence, the total effects of these systems on labour supply 
will entail both an “entitlement” effect and an effect of benefits conditional on entitle-
ment. 
3.1  Taxes 
It is well known that Swedish taxes are high. The labour-supply incentives of taxes, 
however, mainly reflect marginal tax rates and not average tax rates
6 (which must be 
high in a high-tax country). This means that a given amount of taxes collected will 
affect labour supply differently depending on the design of the tax system.  
The Swedish income tax system is divided in two parts; a proportional tax imposed 
by local governments and a slightly nonlinear national (state) income tax. The local tax 
rates differ, with an average rate (the average of the sum of the county, municipal and 
church tax rates) around 30 per cent.
7  
Income taxation has undergone many reforms during the last four decades. A major 
reform was implemented in 1971, when separate tax schedules for couples and singles 
were replaced by a national tax schedule common to all individuals regardless of marital 
                                                 
6 This statement applies to labour supply on the intensive margin. The decision to participate in the labour force is 
primarily affected by average tax rates. 
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lower marginal tax rates for married women. In the early 1980s, the national income tax 
was highly progressive with many tax brackets. Summing local and state taxes, an 
average earner may have faced a marginal income tax rate of around 50 per cent, and 
the top rate exceeded 80 per cent. 
A tax reform implemented 1983–85 mainly reduced marginal income tax rates for 
average and high income earners and reduced the number of tax brackets. In 1991, 
another major tax reform was implemented, resulting in a much simpler system with 
two tax brackets; a zero state income tax for taxable incomes below a threshold and 20 
per cent for higher incomes. 
Although the tax system has undergone frequent changes since 1991, much of the 
basic structure of the system remained fairly intact until recent reforms introduced by 
the present government. In 1995, however, an additional tax bracket was introduced, 
meaning that the top rate for the state income tax since then has been 25 per cent.  
The value added tax rate is 25 per cent. However, for certain types of consumption, 
the rate is lower; either 6 per cent or 12 per cent. The statutory payroll tax rate is around 
30 per cent. 
Most empirical studies of the effects of taxes on labour supply suggest that the 
effects are modest on the intensive margin.
8 Hence, although high marginal income tax 
rates among medium and high-income earners have been a permanent feature of the 
Swedish income tax system, estimated effects on the supply of hours are relatively 
small.
9  
From the perspective of labour force participation, the marginal effect for non-
participants is the interesting margin. The major reform in this respect, disregarding 
recent reforms, is the 1971 move to individual taxation for spouses. Selin (2009) found 
that employment among married women would have been 10 percentage points lower in 
1975 if the 1969 income tax system still had been in place in 1975. Hence, it is likely 
                                                                                                                                               
7 This is not completely true after the recent reforms, see below. 
8 Empirical studies of taxation and labour supply are surveyed in Aronsson & Walker (1997; 2009). 
9 However, the evidence in Ljunge & Ragan (2004), who estimated the effects on the tax base rather than on hours 
worked, suggest somewhat larger effects, in particular for low-income earners. 
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that this reform is one of the contributing factors to the high Swedish female labour 
force participation. 
3.2  Unemployment insurance 
The Swedish unemployment insurance (UI) has a somewhat peculiar construction: the 
rules for UI are regulated by law and the UI system is predominantly tax financed. At 
the same time the insurance is run by around 35 independent organisations, UI funds, 
most of which have close ties to trade unions. Membership, which is necessary for 
income related unemployment benefits, is voluntary. Until recently, membership was 
close to 90 % of the labour force, but membership has declined rapidly after recent 
reforms which led to substantially higher membership fees.  
In order to qualify for income-related benefits, an unemployed worker must have 
been a member of a UI fund for at least 12 months and in addition meet a work 
requirement stipulating some minimum amount of work prior to the unemployment 
spell. Furthermore, the unemployed must be job ready, actively looking for a job and 
prepared to accept a suitable job offer. Job search behaviour is monitored by case 
workers at the public employment service (PES) and violations of the rules may lead to 
sanctions. 
Unemployed who are not members of a UI fund, but meet the same work and job 
search requirements, are entitled to a fixed daily benefit, which is substantially lower 
than the maximum income-related benefit. 
Benefit eligibility lasts for 300 benefit days (420 calendar days; benefits are paid five 
days a week). The replacement rate is 80 % during the first 200 benefit days and then 
70  % until day 300 of the unemployment spell. After this period, the unemployed 
receives 65 % of previous income conditional on entering an activation programme. The 
system is, however, much less generous for most unemployed, because there is a 
maximum daily benefit which is at a fairly low level.
10 On the other hand, a number of 
supplementary insurance programmes have been established through collective 
agreements between trade unions and employers’ organisation. The information on the 
                                                 
10 The system is similar to Danish UI in this respect. 
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exact conditions for unemployed persons is hard to collect. 
3.3  Sickness insurance 
The Swedish sickness insurance has been reformed on many occasions during the last 
two decades. In 1991, sickness benefits were reduced for the first time since the mid-
1950s. Prior to this reform, the replacement rate was 90 % of previous earnings from 
day one of a sickness spell. In 1991, a waiting day was introduced and the replacement 
rate was cut from 90 to 75 percent. Currently, there is a one day waiting period. Days 2 
through 14 are paid by the employer at 80 percent of the worker’s salary (up to a certain 
level). The national health insurance system picks up the cost of the sickness benefits 
from day 15 and on. The replacement rate is 80 % of the pre-illness salary (up to a 
certain amount). Employees are required to get a doctor’s certificate after 7 days. 
Depending on the type of illness (and, therefore, inability to work) the sick leave may 
be part time, in which case the benefit is adjusted accordingly. In addition to the 
national health insurance, there is, as is the case in the UI system, also supplemental 
insurance through collective agreements. 
Sickness absence has been high in Sweden.
11 From a book-keeping perspective this 
is “explained” a very high long-term sickness absence rate. The most likely explanation 
for the high Swedish long-term unemployment is the fact that sickness benefits in 
Sweden have had an indefinitely long duration (OECD, 2009b). A number of recent 
studies, using different reforms to identify effects, have shown that there is a clear 
relationship between the generosity of sickness insurance and sickness absence.
12 
3.4  Early retirement 
The main pathway to early retirement in Sweden has been disability insurance. From 
1970 disability pension could be given for labor market reasons in combination with 
work capacity losses for those at least 63 years old. From 1972 individuals at least 63 
years old with exhausted unemployment benefits were eligible for disability pension for 
                                                 
11 See, for example, the figures presented in OECD (2009b). 
12 See Hesselius (2008) for a short survey and a description of the reforms in the system. See also OECD (2009b) for 
a description of the reforms. 
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labor market reasons only. The eligibility age was lowered to 60 in 1974. This early-
retirement option was removed in 1991.  
In 2003, periodical reviews of work capacity and time limited sickness compensation 
were introduced. The current compensation level in disability retirement
13 is either 
income related up to a ceiling or flat-rate for individuals with low or no income. 
The main source of the inflow to disability pension is long-term sickness absence. 
Inflow rates have been high during recent years, and the disability benefit recipiency 
rate is high (above 10 % in 2007). What is especially troublesome is that the fraction of 
young recipients has been growing rapidly.
14 A number of recent reforms in sickness 
insurance and disability pensions are designed to address the large inflows and stocks in 
long-term sickness and early retirement. There is, however, no evidence available as to 
the effects of these reforms. Indeed, the knowledge of what works in this field is very 
limited. 
3.5  Pensions 
Pension systems will affect labour-supply decisions in many complex ways. These 
effects are often analysed in terms of the implications of the pension system for pension 
wealth.
15 Reforms affecting the level of pension wealth may be seen as reforms of the 
general generosity of a given pension system. Under the reasonable assumption that 
leisure is a normal good, a more generous pension system will have a negative effect on 
labour supply. Another key feature of pension systems is how pension wealth is affected 
by another year of work. The higher the effect of extra work on pension wealth, the 
stronger the incentives to go on working instead of entering retirement. Another 
dimension of pension systems that affects the retirement age is the statutory retirement 
age. There is a strong clustering of retirement around the statutory retirement age that 
cannot be understood unless this parameter of the pension system is taken into account. 
The Swedish pension system was reformed in the 1990s. Both the new and the old 
systems are fundamentally notionally defined contribution systems with pensions based 
                                                 
13 The scheme was renamed in January, 2003. For persons at least 30 years old the new name is “sickness 
compensation” (sjukersättning) and for younger persons the new name is “activity compensation” (Sic!) (aktivitets-
ersättning). 
14 This is an international phenomenon, see OECD (2009b). 
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16 Under the old system, pensions were based on 
an individual’s 15 best years, whereas pensions under the new system are based on the 
whole employment history of an individual. An additional year of work may have a 
stronger impact on pensions in the new system for this reason. The old system was more 
generous, so the effect on pension wealth of the reform can be expected to have 
stimulated labour supply. Finally, in the reformed system labour protection rules apply 
up to age 67 rather 65 as was the case in the old system. Despite a lack of evaluations of 
the Swedish pension reform, we see that the average retirement age among men started 
to increase shortly after the reform was announced after a long period of a falling 
average male retirement age. In 1995 (one year after the reform was announced) the 
average retirement age among men was 62 years. By 2006 it had increased to 63.4 years 
(see The Fiscal Policy Council, 2009).
17 
3.6  Interactions between different income support systems 
When reforming income support systems, it is important to recognise that changes in 
one system will in general induce flows to or from other sources of income support. In 
the Swedish context, Larsson (2006) and Hall & Hartman (2009) showed that 
unemployed workers who could receive sickness benefits that were higher than their 
unemployment benefits tended to report sick. 
To give a perhaps idiosyncratic example to illustrate that interactions between 
systems may matter, Figure 1 shows sickness absence rates and unemployment rates in 
Sweden and Germany as well as the sum of the two in both countries. Although by no 
means evidence for any conclusion about flows between the two types of income 
support, it is striking how much more similar the two countries look when the 
comparison refers to the sum of the two components rather than the components 
separately. 
                                                                                                                                               
15 Pension wealth is the expected present value of net payments from the pension system. 
16 There is a small part of the new system that is based on contributions. 
17 As is the case in many cases in the Swedish set-up, the analysis of the pension system is complicated even further 
by the presence of collectively agreed pensions with conditions that differ across bargaining areas. 





























































































Figure 1: Sickness absence, unemployment and the sum of these rates (joint rates) in 
Sweden and Germany. Source: Hesselius (2008). 
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Access to some kind of child care is a necessary prerequisite for households who want 
to combine children and professional careers for both parents. Given traditional gender 
patterns of household work and market work, access to public child care most likely 
have had an impact on female labour supply. 
Beginning in the mid 1960s, Swedish child care was rapidly extended, and in the late 
1990s, the coverage for children between 0 and 5 years of age was around 80 %. This 
expansion largely took place in the form of heavily subsidised public day care provided 
by the municipalities. Although there is a lack of empirical evidence of the effects of the 
provision of child care on female labour supply, it seems highly likely that public 
provision of day care is an important part of the explanation of the high Swedish female 
labour supply.
18 A related reform, likely to have reinforced the effects of publicly 
provided child care, was the introduction in 1974 of paid parental leave. 
3.8  Active labour market policies 
Sweden has pioneered the use of active labour market policies (ALMPs); the 
foundations of modern ALMPs were laid in the late 1950s, when a National Labour 
Market Board was set up to administer the Public Employment Service (PES) and 
labour market programmes. Sweden also stands out as one of the EU countries devoting 
most resources to ALMPs.
19  
One explicit objective of ALMPs is to improve matching in the labour market. To the 
extent that this objective is actually achieved, ALMPs will contribute to a higher 
employment rate and may also give rise to higher labour force participation. Indeed, 
some evidence suggests that Swedish ALMPs actually contributed to higher labour 
force participation in the 1990s (Calmfors et al., 2004). Evidence also suggests that 
some programmes, targeted at long-term unemployed, may contribute significantly to 
employment in the target group. However, numerous studies on cross-sections and 
panels of countries as well as evaluations of Swedish ALMPs in the 1990s have found 
                                                 
18 There is one study (Lundin et al, 2007) estimating the effects of lowering the prices of child care. The estimated 
effects in this study suggest that there is no effect. However, the reform that is studied is mainly one of lower prices 
in a system that already has a high coverage. 
19 This is, e.g., clear from the data presented in OECD’s Employment Outlook (OECD, 2009a). 
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that the contribution of ALMPs to employment and labour force participation are at best 
modest.
20 Hence, ALMPs do not seem to be a major way to increase labour force 
participation. 
4  Recent reforms in Sweden and some of their expected 
effects 
The present government has implemented a series of labour market reforms, primarily 
addressing issues related to labour supply, labour force participation and sickness 
absenteeism. The reforms have concerned many policy areas, the most important ones 
are perhaps income taxes and unemployment insurance. But I will also describe the 
reforms of active labour market policies, sickness insurance and early retirement. 
4.1  Reforms in unemployment insurance (UI) 
In UI, a number changes have been introduced. First, the maximum replacement rate is 
lowered from 80 % to 70 % after 200 insured days in an unemployment spell.
21 Second, 
the maximum daily benefit has been lowered by approximately 7 % during the 100 first 
days – previously, the maximum amount was higher during the 100 first days.
22 Third, 
the regulations for the coordination between UI and labour market programmes have 
been changed. Earlier, the clock in UI stopped ticking if an unemployed entered a 
labour market programme during an ongoing insured unemployment spell. Under the 
new rules days spent in programmes are counted in the same way as days with UI 
benefits. This means that an insured unemployment spell can last at most for 300 
insured days (420 calendar days). Finally, the funding of UI system has been changed in 
a way that has increased membership fees substantially and also introduced a small 
degree of experience rating.
23 All these reforms can be expected to affect flows from 
unemployment to work at a given wage rate, but also wage setting. 
                                                 
20 Much of this research is surveyed in Calmfors et al. (2004). See also the survey by Kluve (2006). 
21 200 insured days correspond to 280 days in calendar time; the daily benefit is paid out five days a week. 
22 The maximum amount was lowered from 730 SEK (approximately 70 Euros) to 680 SEK a day. 
23 In the present system there is a rather weak connection between the membership fee in a UI fund and the 
unemployment rate for the fund’s members. 
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Continuity rather than structural breaks characterises recent reforms in active labour 
market policies in most respects. One possible exception from this is that a significant 
fraction of actual policy measures now are contracted out to private providers. Although 
an interesting experiment, it is far too early to pronounce any verdict on the effects of 
contracting out. Evidence from a pilot study, a small-scale randomised experiment, 
suggests some, but limited differences between the public employment service and 
private providers of job-search assistance. The most clear-cut result was that long-term 
unemployed immigrants benefited from receiving job-search assistance from private 
providers (Bennmarker et al, 2009). 
The most prominent feature of recent ALMP reforms, which complement the 
reforms in UI creating more incentives for job search, is that they generally imply more 
focus on job search assistance. There are several examples of this. A new programme 
targeted at young unemployed involves a first phase of mandatory job search; a 
programme for long-term unemployed also involves a first phase with job search as one 
main ingredient. In addition, more resources have been allocated to case workers, both 
hired by the PES and among private providers.  
Another feature of the reforms is that they have put more focus on time limits and 
structure (“rules”) during an unemployment spell and leave less discretion to case 
workers. 
None of the reforms has as yet been evaluated. But the evidence on similar policy 
initiatives suggests that the focus on job search assistance is warranted.
24 Regarding the 
question of whether rules or discretion works best, there is some evidence that 
programmes where the entry date can be predicted with some accuracy are associated 
with pre-programme effects.
25 
                                                 
24 See Kluve (2006) and Calmfors et al. (2004) for evidence. 
25 There is some evidence of a pre-programme effect of a previous programme for young persons (Forslund & 
Nordström Skans, 2006) with a rule based entry time. The effect was an increased flow to jobs before the expected 
entry into the programme. Similar results were found by Hägglund (2006) in a small-scale randomised experiment. It 
is not clear how much these results can be generalised. 
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4.3  Reforms in sickness insurance 
Sickness insurance has been reformed in a number of ways, many of which implying 
more control. First, the sickness benefit period is now limited to one year, as opposed to 
the previous system with sickness benefits of unlimited duration. Needless to say, this 
will give rise to shorter sickness spells. The interesting (still open) question, however, is 
whether the reform will bring more persons to work or whether the result will be an 
increase in early retirement or some other long-term state not involving market work.  
Second, a “rehabilitation chain” has been introduced. Under the rehabilitation chain, 
the sickness benefit claimant receives sickness benefits for three months if he or she is 
unable to go back to the old work. After three months, a meeting is to take place and the 
sickness benefit claimant can receive benefits for another three months if no other job at 
the present employer can be found. At the same time the benefit claimant should use the 
public employment service to look for jobs outside the present employer. Another 
meeting should take place after 6 months. Sickness benefit receipt after this meeting is 
conditional on not having any (or reduced, in which case sickness benefits can be part-
time) capacity to do a regular job anywhere in the labour market. To the extent that the 
sickness benefit claimant is ruled to be able to do market work, he or she is referred to 
the public employment service like any other unemployed person and should instead 
claim unemployment benefits. 
The rehabilitation chain has not been evaluated. Some knowledge can, however, be 
gained from knowledge of the effects of increased control in sickness insurance.
26 A 
large-scale experiment involving the time at which a doctor’s certificate is compulsory 
for benefit receipt convincingly demonstrated that increased control (shorter period 
before certificate necessary) gave rise to an increased flow from sickness benefits to 
work (Hesselius et al., 2005). Similar findings resulted from an experiment involving 
randomised timing of information meetings for benefit claimants (Johansson & Lindahl, 
2008). Hence, to the extent that the rehabilitation chain involves more control of the 
benefit claimant, it should be expected to increase the flow from sickness benefit receipt 
to work. 
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Parallel to the reforms in sickness insurance, a number of reforms have been introduced 
in early retirement with the aim of reducing both the stock and the inflow. An 
interesting experiment is that more generous rules apply to the stock of individuals 
already receiving sickness compensation or activity compensation before July, 2008, in 
that they can earn substantial labour incomes before income support is first reduced and 
finally phased out completely. At the same time rules are tightened for individuals 
flowing into the system as well as for persons on temporary early retirement. 
The reform obviously creates economic incentives for early retirees for job search as 
well as for rehabilitation. There is, however, a fundamental lack of knowledge both of 
labour supply and labour demand elasticities for this group of persons, which makes it 
hard to predict the order of magnitude of the effect.  
4.5  Tax reforms 
The main element in the recent series of Swedish tax reforms can be characterised as an 
earned income tax credit (EITC). The explicit main objective of the reforms has been to 
stimulate labour supply and employment. In Figure 2 the marginal tax rates applying to 
labour income before and after the sequence of reforms are plotted. As is clearly visible, 
the main thrust of the reforms has been to lower marginal tax rates for low and medium 
income earners. As nothing is phased out, the effect for high income earners is a lower 
average income tax rate at unchanged marginal tax rates. The design implies that the 
share of a wage increase that is taxed away after a transition from non-work to work is 
monotonically decreasing in income. At the monthly wage rate of a low-income earner 
in health care (SEK 19 000) taxes are lowered by 5.8 %, whereas at the wage rate of a 
doctor (SEK 50 000) taxes are lowered by 3.0 % as a result of the reforms. The reforms 
certainly have decreased tax wedges and made market work more profitable. Hence, the 
expected effect is that the reforms have increased labour supply, at least at the extensive 
margin. Notice, however, that the EITC is counteracted by the increased membership 
fees in UI, which fall exclusively on employed UI fund members. This increase is just 
                                                                                                                                               
26 The rehabilitation chain also involves rehabilitation. Unfortunately, there is an almost complete lack of knowledge 
about the effects of rehabilitation. 
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below 3 % at SEK 100 000 annual income and just below 2 % at annual income SEK 
150 000. This implies that the net effects at low incomes should be in the order of 4 %. 
 
Figure 2: Marginal labour income tax rates (%) before (dotted line) and after (solid line) 
tax reforms 
Source: Government Bill 2008/09:1 
 
Another reform of the tax system is the implementation of a tax reduction for certain 
household services. For the services to which the deductions apply, the household 
receives 50 % of the labour cost as a direct reduction of income tax. This reform should 
first and foremost be expected to decrease the size of black-market work, but there 
should also be some efficiency gain to the extent that households substitute the purchase 
of those services for household production. 
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These reforms are too recent for any (ex post) evaluation to have taken place.
27 To get 
an idea about the magnitudes of expected effects, I use parameters estimated for other 
purposes and use these together with some simple theory. The earlier studies are either 
micro studies, which do not capture general equilibrium effects, or macro studies, which 
in the best of worlds will capture both individual responses and general equilibrium 
effects. The macro studies either use within-country aggregate time series variation or 
panel data for a number of countries to identify the relevant parameters. 
5.1  Expected effects of reforms in the UI system 
To predict the likely impact of UI reforms, three types of evidence can be used: micro 
studies of previous reforms in the UI system, macro studies of Swedish wage setting 
and macro studies of unemployment/wage setting for panels of OECD countries. 
Estimates from the first type of studies can be used to estimate effects on equilibrium 
unemployment excluding effects through wage setting. Results from the macro studies 
should give us general equilibrium effects. As lower UI benefits never will raise wages 
according to any standard theoretical model, the micro studies will a priori give a lower 
bound for the total effects.  
5.1.1  Micro studies 
There are some studies of the effect of reforms in Swedish UI on the flow from 
unemployment to employment. The study with the most credible identification strategy 
is Carling et al. (2001). This study identified the effects of lowering the replacement rate 
from 80 % to 75 % in January, 1996, by comparing a treatment group with a control 
group that was not affected by the reform because their benefits were restricted by the 
maximum daily benefit rather than by the replacement rate.  
A main result in Carling et al. (2001) is that the elasticity of the hazard from 
unemployment to employment with respect to the UI benefit was estimated to around 
1.6. How large an effect on unemployment does this imply?  
                                                 
27 However, the reform effects have been simulated in a number of papers (Aaberge & Flood, 2008; Ericson et al, 
2009; Sacklén, 2009). 
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Assuming a flow equilibrium in the labour market where flows to and from 
unemployment are of equal size, it can be shown that the effect on unemployment is 
proportional to the elasticity of the hazard from unemployment to employment with 
respect to the UI benefit and that the factor of proportionality equals the ratio of 
employment to the labour force. 
Given an employment to labour force ratio at slightly above 0.9, the results reported 
above imply that the elasticity of unemployment with respect to unemployment benefits 
should be approximately equal to 1.5. 
It is, however, not entirely evident how large the decrease in UI benefits due to the 
reforms is for an “average” or “typical” unemployed. The reforms entail a lower 
maximum daily benefit during the first 100 days, a lower replacement rate after 200 
days and a shorter effective benefit period. These changes affect different subsamples of 
unemployed differently, and it is not obvious that it is meaningful to summarise all 
these changes into one single index number. Given some information on the pool of 
unemployed, it would seem reasonable that the reforms have lowered the benefits by 
something between 5 % and 10 %. Given such an interval, the reforms can be expected 
to have lowered equilibrium unemployment by between 0.5 and 1 percentage point. 
5.1.2  Studies on Swedish macro data 
A number of studies of Swedish wage setting have incorporated measures of the 
generosity of UI. Most of these have not found any significant effects.
28 An exception is 
Forslund et al. (2008), who estimated a model with a wage-setting equation and a labour 
demand equation. This model can be solved for long-run equilibrium effects of UI 
benefits on wages and unemployment. The estimated long-run versions of the estimated 
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include constants and exogenous variables. These two equations can be solved for 
wages and unemployment, and it is straightforward to compute the elasticity of 
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equal to 3, so the general equilibrium effects found using this model are about twice as 
large as the effects derived from the micro estimates.
29 
5.1.3  Studies on panels of countries 
There is a large literature, initiated by Layard et al. (1991), using panel data on different 
sub-samples of OECD countries to estimate effects of different policies and institutions 
on employment/unemployment.
30 Two fairly recent studies in this tradition are Nickell 
et al. (2005) and Bassanini & Duval (2006). Both studies include estimates of the effect 
of UI benefits on unemployment. 
The estimates in Nickell et al. (2005) imply an elasticity of unemployment with 
respect to UI equal to 1.9 evaluated at 5 % unemployment. Bassanini & Duval (2006) 
estimated that lowering the replacement rate by 10 percentage points would give a 
decrease in unemployment amounting to approximately one percentage point. In both 
cases the effects are smaller than those found by Forslund et al. (2008), but still non-
trivial.  
5.2  Expected effects of tax reforms 
Given the design of the Swedish EITC, we should first and foremost expect an impact 
on the extensive margin, and incentives should be strongest at low incomes. How large 
an effect should we expect? I am not aware of any direct estimates on Swedish data of 
such elasticities.
31 
However, one possibility is to use estimated effects of UI reforms. The argument is 
that in both cases, what is affected is the relative payoff of work compared to non-work. 
However, the tax reforms should affect both unemployed job seekers and persons not in 
the labour force. For the former group, the analysis is completely analogous to the 
analysis of the UI reform. Given that the tax reduction, including the effects of 
                                                                                                                                               
28 Perhaps due to the fact that it is hard to capture all relevant dimensions of UI generosity in one single measure. 
29 This elasticity may seem high, but it is nevertheless lower than the estimated elasticity in Fredriksson & 
Söderström (2008), who used regional panel data to estimate unemployment effects of UI. 
30 Cahuc & Zylberberg (2004) surveys this literature. 
31 Flood et al. (2003) found positive labour supply effects for single mothers of a reform where taxes, social 
assistance and child care fees were lowered. Andrén (2003) simulated non-trivial effects for the same group of lower 
taxes and lower social assistance. 
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increased UI membership fees is around 4 %, the elasticity estimated by Carling et al. 
(2001) implies that unemployment should decrease by approximately 6 % or just below 
half a percentage point. 
For persons outside the labour force, the incentives to go to work are affected in a 
similar way. However, it is not obvious that the estimated effects on hazards to 
employment can be applied directly to this group, so if anything, the effects should be 
smaller. 
Another way to derive estimates of the reform effect is to use estimates of the 
participation elasticity from other countries. Krueger & Meyer (2002) survey studies of 
how the participation decision is affected by different social security programmes and 
conclude that the elasticity is significantly larger than the usually very low estimated 
elasticities of tax changes on hours worked. The best “guess” of the participation 
elasticity in Krueger & Meyer (2002) is that it approximately equals one. If this number 
is correct, the reform effect would approximately equal 4 %. 
All this is based on constant wages. Studies of wage setting on aggregate Swedish 
data suggest that tax changes affect consumption real wages – if the tax wedge between 
product real wages and consumption real wages decreases, consumption real wages tend 
to increase proportionately. These results are, however, not necessarily directly appli-
cable to the EITC. The studies pertain to aggregate wage setting, and it is not obvious 
that the mechanisms are the same for those most affected by the reforms – new entrants 
into the labour market. These are probably to a smaller extent unionised and can be 
described as “outsiders” in the labour market, so it is not completely clear how relevant 
earlier studies are for this labour market segment. 
Kolm & Tonin (2008) analyse equilibrium effects of an EITC is a theoretical search 
model and find that wages under reasonable assumptions will fall. If this result is 
applicable, the effects would be larger than in the case with unchanged wages. It is, 
however, impossible to have any empirically based view on the size of the wage setting 
effect. 
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Swedish women and old Swedes are labour force participants to a higher degree than in 
most other countries. Institutional design is likely to be an important explanation of the 
high female labour force participation. First, access to child care and paid parental leave 
has enabled Swedish women to combine child rearing with professional careers. 
Second, a switch in 1971 to from family income taxes to individually paid income taxes 
is likely to have contributed substantially to higher female labour force participation.  
The fact that older Swedes have high labour force participation is not equally straight 
forward to understand. The recent rise in labour force participation is likely to reflect 
incentives to work in the reformed pension system. However, also prior to this reform 
older Swedes had a relatively high participation rate. One possible interpretation is that, 
although by no means a perfect system from a labour supply perspective, also the old 
Swedish pension system provided less disincentives to work that the pension systems in 
many other countries. It is also noteworthy that early retirement has never been offi-
cially endorsed as a way to combat high unemployment in Sweden – the possibility to 
get disability pension for labour market reasons was actually removed in 1991 in the 
beginning of the worst post-war unemployment crisis in the Swedish economy. 
Active labour market policies have been a part of the Swedish policy package for 
quite a long time. Available evidence suggests that although some programmes actually 
seem to contribute to higher employment rates in target groups, these effects are at best 
modest. Hence, ALMPs cannot be relied on as a major means to encourage labour force 
participation. Reforms in labour market policies have implied a stronger focus on job-
search assistance. This shift is supported by available evidence on the effects of active 
labour market policies. 
Recent reforms in unemployment insurance and income taxation have been 
undertaken with the explicit aim of promoting labour supply. As yet, there are no ex 
post evaluations of these reforms, but using knowledge from previous empirical studies 
of changes in taxes and unemployment insurance, the prediction is that these reforms 
will actually have a non-trivial positive effect on labour force participation. 
Careful institutional design involves getting the incentives right in different income-
support programmes. A general lesson learned from the Swedish example, however, is 
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that it is also important to consider the interdependence between the different 
programmes. If rules are tightened in one programme, benefit claimants may often get 
incentives to use other systems if possible. This is found in studies of the interaction 
between unemployment insurance and sickness insurance in Sweden, where unem-
ployed workers who gain from higher sickness benefits have been found to report sick. 
The example of Swedish female labour force participation also suggests that positive 
policy complementarities should be considered – it is likely that it is the interaction 
between tax reforms, child care reforms and parental leave reforms that have resulted in 
the high Swedish female labour force participation. 
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